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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CHOICE OF ADJUDICATION: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ARBITRARY NEW RULE 
Gilbert Gaynor· 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (hereinaf-
ter Francis Ford),! a panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the FTC did not have the 
discretion to act by adjudication against three auto makers, their 
financing subsidiaries, and three auto dealers in matters involv-
ing consumer credit practices. Because the adjudication 
"change[d] existing law, and ha[d] widespread application,"1 the 
unanimous three-judge panel wrote sweepingly, the matter could 
be addressed only through a formal rulemaking proceeding. 
The Francis Ford decision was immediately recognized in 
the legal press as having potentially farreaching application in 
all areas of federal administrative law.8 As it stands, the ruling 
severely limits the FTC's options in dealing with unfair trade 
practices in the Ninth Circuit,· and circumscribes the scope of 
discretion of other federal agencies as well. The decision was ap-
pealed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari 
on November 8, 1982. a Justices White and O'Connor dissented 
from the denial of review." 
• Member of the California Bar; J.D. cum laude, Whittier College School of Law. 
Currently Research Attorney to Presiding Justice Margaret J. Morris, California Court 
of Appeal, Fourth District, Division II. The author wishes to thank Professors David M. 
Treiman and Thomas Papageorge for their criticism and encouragement. 
1. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were 
Kennedy and Alarcon, JJ.) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, April 5, 1982. Rein· 
hardt, J. dissented from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982). 
2. 673 F.2d at 1010. 
3. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 4. 
4. [d. See also ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-8 (Sept. 2, 1981). 
5. 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982). 
6. [d. 
1 
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After summarizing the facts in the case' and the decision 
and analysis of the Francis Ford court,8 the opinion will be ex-
amined in light of the relevant case law. It will be demonstrated 
that Francis Ford relied on wrongly decided Ninth Circuit pre-
cedent,9 and failed to recognize or apply the decisional method-
ology of the three United States Supreme Court cases which de-
lineate the general scope of administrative agency discretion to 
proceed through adjudication rather than rulemaking. Io It will 
be argued that the rule of Francis Ford is inconsistent with the 
proper principles of decision which emerge from the three High 
Court cases,II and has severe workability problems. IS It will be 
concluded that, as a radical and unjustified departure from 
tested and sound principles of review, the Francis Ford decision 
should be overruled at the first opportunity. 
B. THE FACTS 
The unfair practice that was the target of the adjudicatory 
proceedings was that practice whereby auto dealers would, in 
concert with the automakers and their financing subsidiaries, 
credit consumer debtors with merely the wholesale value of cars 
which had been repossessed from them, charge the debtors with 
both direct expenses (e.g., repair) and indirect expenses, includ-
ing "lost profits," and subsequently resell the cars at retail, 
pocketing the surpluses. IS 
The FTC brought administrative actions against nine com-
panies-each of the Big 3 automakers, their financing subsidiar-
ies, and three dealerships. All but Francis Ford, a Portland, Ore-
gon dealer, signed consent agreements: they would cease and 
desist from the challenged practice, and make restitution total-
ing some $2 million to injured consumers.I4 The action contin-
ued against Francis Ford, and an administrative law judge held 
that Francis Ford's practices violated section 5 of the FTCA.IIi 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 13-15. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 16-24. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 28-43. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 44-92. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 93-100. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 101-108. 
13. 673 F.2d at 1009. 
14. 93 F.T.C. 402 (1979). modified, 96 F.T.C. 32 (1980). 
15. [d. See 5 U.S.C. § 5 (1976). 
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Francis Ford appealed, making numerous allegations of error. 
C. THE DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit panel characterized the issue presented 
as "narrow": "whether the F.T.C. should have proceeded by 
rulemaking in ~his case rather than by adjudication. "18 The 
court then set forth the general principles it believed governed 
the case. While noting that administrative agencies are not pre-
cluded from announcing new policies through adjudication, and 
that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the 
first instance with the agency, the court underscored that there 
may be situations in which the use of adjudication would be an 
abuse of discretion.17 The problem, the Francis Ford court rec-
ognized, was one of line-drawing. The court quoted the Supreme 
Court's statement in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.: "It is doubt-
ful whether any generalized standard could be framed which 
would have more than marginal utility."IB 
• 
With the general principles sufficiently invoked, the Francis 
Ford court then turned to recent Ninth Circuit precedent. In 
Patel v. INS,19 decided in 1980, a Ninth Circuit panel had held 
that the INS should have proceeded by rulemaking rather than 
by adjudication in adding a requirement to a regulation gov-
erning immigration to the United States. "The thrust of the 
Patel holding," the Francis Ford court wrote, "is that . . . an 
agency must proceed by rule making if it seeks to change the 
law and establish rules of widespread application. ''20 "Framed 
according to Patel, the precise issue therefore is whether this ad-
judication changes existing law, and has widespread application. 
[If] lilt does, ... the matter should be addressed by 
rulemaking. "11 
Having isolated the law it believed determinative, the Fran-
cis Ford court then applied it to the facts at hand. The court 
found that since the FTC had cited no cases in accord with its 
interpretation of Francis Ford's credit practices as violative of 
16. 673 F.2d at 1009. 
17.Id. 
18. 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974), quoted at 673 F.2d at 1009. 
19. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980). 
20. 673 F.2d at 1009 (emphasis added). 
21. Id. at 1010. 
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state law (the Oregon enactment of UCC 9-504), the adjudica-
tion therefore "changed existing law."22 Since the FTC had 
deemed it appropriate to address other credit practices under 
UCC 9-504 through rulemaking, "it should also address the 
problem of accounting for surpluses by a rule making proceeding, 
and not by adjudication."23 Finally, the Francis Ford court 
found that "because the rule of the case made below will have 
general application,"2' it must necessarily be addressed through 
rulemaking. 
D. ANALYSIS OF FRANCIS FORD 
In its summary analysis and conclusory sweep, the Francis 
Ford court erred in reliance on Patel v. INS, a decision which is 
demonstrably incorrect. The Francis Ford court also failed to 
understand or apply the decisional methodology established by 
the three Supreme Court cases-SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Che-
nery 11),2& NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon CO./.J8 and NLRB v. Bell 
Aerospace Co.27-which control the vital question of administra-
tive discretion to proceed by adjudication rather than rulemak-
ing. Instead, making questionable use of precedent and allowing 
unresolved internal inconsistencies, the Francis Ford court ar-
rived at and applied a dubious "generalized standard" to deter-
mine whether the agency had made an allowable use of its dis-
cretion. This generalized standard has severe. workability 
problems and serves as nothing less than a sub rosa repudiation 
of Chenery II in the Ninth Circuit. 
1. Francis Ford erred in reliance on Patel 
Patel is the only case authority cited by the Francis Ford 
court to support its conclusion that when an adjudication 
changes existing law and has widespread application, rule making 
should be employed. Therefore, if Patel can be shown to have 
been incorrectly decided, Francis Ford is rendered highly 
suspect. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. 332 u.s. 194, reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 783 (1947). This case is referred to as Che-
nery II to distinguish it from an earlier, related case involving the same parties, SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
26. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
27. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
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The Patel court in turn relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Wyman-Gordon. In order to understand why Patel was 
erroneously decided, it is necessary to understand the facts and 
ratio decidendi of both Patel and Wyman-Gordon. 
Material to Patel was an "investor exemption" in the INS 
regulation under scrutiny. To qualify for the exemption, and 
thereby permanent immigration into the United States; the in-
vestor must show at least one year's experience in the particular 
investment field, and an investment of at least $40,000.28 In In 
re Heitland29 in 1974, the INS, by adjudication, added a third 
requirement to the investor exemption: the alien's investment 
"must tend to expand job opportunities"30 in this country. Patel, 
the investor who wished to immigrate, met the first two require-
ments, which had been codified in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. Although he had notice of the third requirement, he did 
not meet it. He challenged the last requirement on the ground 
that the INS had abused its discretion in announcing the re-
quirement in the context of an adjudication rather than through 
rulemaking. The Patel court held that there was such an 
abuse.31 
Wyman-Gordon also involved a prior adjudication. In its 
1966 decision in Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,32 the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB) "purported to establish the general 
rule [that employers must furnish a list of employees to unions 
for election purposes], ... but it declined to apply its new rule 
to the companies involved"33 in the case. After not applying the 
Excelsior rule to the Excelsior case, the NLRB then sought to 
apply it against the Wyman-Gordon Company. 
The Supreme Court found an explicit statutory violation on 
the part of the NLRB: section 6 of the National Labor Relations 
Act34 directed the NLRB to make rules in the manner pre-
scribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The rule 
28. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1982). 
29. 14 I. & N. Dec. 563 (1974). 
30. [d. at 567. 
31. 638 F.2d at 1205. 
32. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
33. 394 U.S. at 763. 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976). 
5
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the NLRB sought to make in the Excelsior adjudication was un-
questionably a "rulemaking rule" as contrasted with an "adjudi-
cative rule," because, under the APA, a "rulemaking rule" is one 
of "future effect,"StI one which is purely prospective in operation. 
In Excelsior, the NLRB sought to make a rule of only prospec-
tive application through the adjudicative process. This it could 
not do: "There is no warrant in law for the Board to replace the 
statutory scheme with a rule-making procedure of its own inven-
tion," stated the Court.S8 
Nothing in Wyman-Gordon precludes the use of adjudica-
tion in the formulation of agency policy; however, a valid adjudi-
cation may still create binding precedent. Wyman-Gordon 
merely clarified that adjudication may not be used to make pur-
portedly quasi-legislative rules, or to make adjudicative rules 
which are not binding on the parties to the adjudication, but 
only on parties to future adjudications.87 
Patel relied heavily on Wyman-Gordon. The Patel court 
analogized Heitland to Excelsior, and although in Heitland the 
new rule had been applied to the parties to the adjudication, 
declared that "Heitland, like Excelsior, created a broad require-
ment of prospective application .... Under the authority of 
Wyman-Gordon, we conclude that if the INS wished to add the 
job-creation criterion, it should have done so in a rulemaking 
procedure."8s 
The reliance on Wyman-Gordon and the analogy of 
Heitland to Excelsior reveal that the Patel court completely 
failed to isolate the outcome-determinative elements of Wyman-
Gordon; indeed, failed to recognize what that case held. The gra-
vamen of Wyman-Gordon was that the NLRB abused its discre-
tion in Excelsior by purporting to make a legislative-type rule 
through an adjudicative proceeding.89 What was the factor which 
made the rule a legislative-type one? It was that the rule was 
35. 394 U.S. at 763-64. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976) provides that a .. 'rule' means the 
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future 
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the or-
ganization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency .... " 
36. 394 U.S. at 765. 
37.1d. 
38. 638 F.2d at 1203-04. 
39. 394 U.S. at 765. 
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prospective only in application. It was not applied to the parties 
to the adjudication; it had only future effect. Thus, it fell 
squarely within the definition of what a legislative rule is: "an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and fu-
ture effect. ""0 
Since the Heitland rule was applied in Heitland, it was not, 
contrary to the Patel court's assumption, a rule of future effect 
within the meaning of that phrase as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court. As the Wyman-Gordon dissent makes clear, the 
entire case turns on this pointY 
The Patel court's misuse of Supreme Court precedent was 
not limited to Wyman-Gordon however; the Ninth Circuit panel 
additionally misconstrued both Chenery II and Bell Aerospace 
in assuming, without analysis, that the examples given in each 
decision of instances where adjudication would be appropriate 
were meant to be exclusive, rather than illustrative, of proper 
agency exercise of discretion.42 The Patel court further rigidified 
the scope of discretion in writing that the H eitland rule was not 
valid because it "does not call for a case-by-case determination. 
It may be stated and applied as a general rule even though the 
result may vary from case to case."43 Under this reasoning, how-
ever, since the SEC's rule at issue in Chenery II, restricting 
stock trading by corporate management during corporate reorga-
nizations, was a rule which could be stated and applied gener-
ally, although the result would vary from case to case, it too 
would have to fall. On this point, Patel conflicts directly with 
the superior precedent of Chenery II. 
To give operative effect to the Patel court's assumptions re-
garding Chenery II and Bell Aerospace would be to drastically 
undercut the central theme of both decisions-that there is 
broad agency discretion to proceed by adjudication rather than 
rulemaking-not narrow discretion from a circumscribed list of 
adjudicatory procedures found appropriate at other times for 
other agencies. 
40. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976), quoted at 394 U.S. at 763-64. 
41. 394 U.S. at 769, 774 (Black, J., dissenting). 
42. 638 F.2d at 1204-05, citing Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202-03, and Bell Aerospace, 
416 U.S. at 1294. 
43. 638 F.2d at 1205. 
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2. Francis Ford erred in failing to follow Chenery II and Bell 
Aerospace 
In addition to its reliance on the incorrectly decided Patel, 
the Francis Ford court erred in failing to understand or apply 
the decisional methodology established by the Supreme Court in 
Chenery II and Bell Aerospace. These cases, read together with 
Wyman-Gordon, delineate the governing analytic framework by 
which federal courts should determine whether an administra-
tive agency has abused its discretion by proceeding through ad-
judication in a given matter. 
a. Chenery II 
In Chenery II, the question was whether the SEC could ap-
ply a newly formulated policy-that members of corporate man-
agement could not trade in their company's securities during the 
period of a corporate reorganization, even where there was no 
allegation of fraud or concealment-against the parties to the 
case without first proceeding through formal rulemaking. H The 
Supreme Court held that the SEC could validly proceed without 
promulgating a rule.411 
While the Court's opinion in Chenery II is not a model of 
structural clarity, several major analytic themes unmistakably 
emerge to provide the proper principles for judicial review of an 
administrative agency decision to proceed by adjudication. 
The controlling principle, reiterated no less than five times 
in the course of the Court's opinion,4s is that of judicial defer-
ence to administrative judgment. The reason for such deference 
is fundamental: administrative agencies are expert in their 
fields, and are best equipped to make judgments in them. This is 
not merely tautological; the expertise of administrative judg-
ment no less than "justifies the use of the administrative pro-
cess."'" Chenery II establishes a strong presumption against 
finding an abuse of administrative discretion.48 
44. 332 U.S. at 196-99. 
45. Id. at 209. 
46. See 332 U.S. at 213 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
47. 332. U.S. at 209. 
48. [d. at 202-03, 207. 
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In determining whether there has been an abuse of discre-
tion, the Court looked at the nature and structure of the under-
lying legislation empowering the agency to act. How broad is the 
agency's discretion as envisioned by Congress?49 In Chenery II, 
the Court found that Congress had intended the SEC to have 
"broad powers to protect the various interests at stake . . . . 
The very breadth of the statutory language precludes a reversal 
of the Commission's judgment save where it has plainly abused 
its discretion in these matters. "110 
The Court additionally considered the appropriateness of 
proceeding without formal rulemaking in the particular case. Is 
there a "reasonable basis" for doing SO?1I1 "[W]e are free to dis-
turb the Commission's conclusion only if it lacks any rational 
and statutory foundation . . . ."1IlI 
Finally, Chenery II calls for an explicit balancing test. First, 
the reviewing court is to consider the "retroactive effect" of al-
lowing the adjudication to stand.1IS ("Every case of first impres-
sion has a retroactive effect .... ")114 The retroactive effect in 
Chenery II was that stock transactions by the defendants com-
pleted prior to the adjudication and application of the new rule 
would be stripped of profit. 1I1I Second, "such retroactivity must 
be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is 
contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable princi-
ples. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroac-
tive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroac-
tivity which is condemned by law."lIe 
b. Bell Aerospace 
Twenty-seven years after it first addressed the problem of 
administrative discretion to proceed by adjudication, the Su-
preme Court confirmed the validity of its earlier decision by me-
thodically applying the principles announced in Chenery II to 
49. [d. at 208. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 202·03, 207. 
52. Id. at 207. 
53. Id. at 203. 
54.Id. 
55. Id. at 197·98, 203. 
56. Id. at 203. 
9
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find, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace CO.,1I7 that the NLRB would 
not abuse its discretion in proceeding through adjudication to 
make an employee classification. 
Prior to Bell Aerospace, the NLRB had excluded all mana-
gerial employees from National Labor Relations Act coverage. liS 
In this case, the NLRB sought to include buyers under the Act's 
coverage even though it was believed that they were "managerial 
employees," and certified a union, after requisite election, as the 
exclusive bargaining agent of Bell Aerospace's buyers. The com-
pany refused to bargain, however, and litigation resulted.1I9 The 
Supreme Court found, first, that all employees properly classi-
fied as "managerial" were excluded from coverage.60 The second 
issue was whether the NLRB was required in the future to pro-
ceed by rulemaking rather than adjudication in determining 
whether buyers were or were not managerial employees. The 
Court held, unanimously on the issue, that the NLRB was not 
precluded from proceeding through adjudication in making such 
a determination.61 
As the Bell Aerospace Court was not reviewing a past 
agency adjudication to determine whether an agency had in fact 
abused its discretion, it was not logically necessary to invoke the 
principle of judicial deference to past administrative judgment. 
Nevertheless, the Court quoted extensively from Chenery II and 
Wyman-Gordon on the broad scope of agency discretion,62 stat-
ing that those cases "make plain that the Board is not precluded 
from announcing new principals in an adjudicative proceeding 
and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in 
the first instance within the Board's discretion."6s 
The second part of the judicial inquiry concerned the 
agency's statutory authority to act. In Bell Aerospace, the Court 
57. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
58. [d. at 275-79. 
59. [d. at 269-72. 
60. [d. at 289. 
61. [d. at 289-90. Four Justices dissented from the view that managerial employees 
as a class were not covered under the NLRA, but concurred without separate comment 
in the holding that the NLRB was not precluded from proceeding by adjudication in the 
case. 416 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting in part). 
62. [d. at 292-94. 
63. [d. at 294. 
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considered and brought to the forefront the NLRB's authority 
to act in an early part of the opinion, dealing with congressional 
intent to exclude from NLRA coverage all employees properly 
classified as "managerial," but to leave the determination of 
which employees were in fact "managerial" with the Board.Sf 
Next, the Court turned to whether there was a reasonable 
basis for proceeding by adjudication in the present case. It 
found "ample indication that adjudication is especially appro-
priate. . . "SII because of the particular nature of the determina-
tion the NLRB had to make: whether buyers in any number of 
contexts were managerial. 
In conclusion, the Bell Aerospace Court performed the bal-
ancing required by Chenery II: It found that there was a failure 
to demonstrate adverse consequences for the parties involved by 
virtue of past good faith reliance on Board decisions.ss By clear 
implication, retroactivity was approved. 
The Court also noted that the rulemaking which it refused 
to mandate would indeed provide a forum for the views of those 
affected in industry and labor. But such a forum is not an end in 
itself. The purpose of providing such a forum, the Court 
stressed, was simply to supply the agency with "the relevant in-
formation necessary to mature and fair consideration of the is-
sues."S7 It was well within the Board's discretion in the instant 
case to decide that adjudication might also produce such data. 
Any suggestion that non-parties to the adjudication had a "right 
to be heard" in a rulemaking forum was summarily foreclosed; 
due process was satisfied because "[t]hose most immediately af-
fected, the buyers and the company in the particular case, are 
accorded a full opportunity to be heard before the Board makes 
its determination. "S8 
c. Wyman-Gordon reconciled 
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.se is the only Supreme Court 
64. [d. at 279·84. 
65. [d. at 294. 
66. [d. at 295. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. 
69. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
11
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case to find that an agency actually had abused its discretion in 
proceeding through adjudication. As such, it appeared to Profes-
sor Kenneth Davis, the noted administrative law commentator, 
to "pull in the opposite direction" from Bell Aerospace.7o But 
Wyman-Gordon is entirely consistent with Bell Aerospace, and 
with Chenery II as well. 
While the controlling principle is one of deference to admin-
istrative judgment, in Wyman-Gordon the agency had clearly 
acted outside the scope of its statutory authority. It had pur-
ported to promulgate a legislative-type rule without adhering to 
the congressionally-mandated procedures to be followed in mak-
ing a legislative-type rule.71 Thus, it had abused its discretion. 
Therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the inquiry 
as to the appropriateness of adjudication in Wyman-Gordon, or 
to perform the balancing test of Chenery II. On the other hand, 
if the NLRB had applied the rule it promulgated in Excelsior to 
the parties in that case, as the Court declared it could validly 
have done,7lI there would have been no abuse of discretion. The 
Bell Aerospace Court, citing approvingly to Wyman-Gordon,78 
clearly recognized there was no conflict between the cases. 
d. Synthesis 
The decisional methodology delineated by the Supreme 
Court for use in deciding whether an administrative agency has 
abused its discretion by proceeding through adjudication in a 
given matter is not rigid or mechanical. Instead, it is sensitive to 
several factors and principles. First, the presumption that an 
agency has not abused its discretion is to be taken seriously. 
Second, the reviewing court should look to the statutory struc-
ture and legislative intent to gauge the extent of the agency's 
discretionary scope. Third, the court should consider whether 
there is a rational basis for proceeding by adjudication in the 
instant case. Finally, the court should perform the balancing test 
of Chenery II and Bell Aerospace. 
70. 2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 7:25, at 122 (1980). 
71. 394 U.S. at 763-64. 
72. [d. at 765. 
73. 416 U.S. at 293-94, quoting Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 765-66. 
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3. Precedent ignored 
The Francis Ford court failed to apply the decisional meth-
odology of the Supreme Court to the facts before it. 
The Ninth Circuit panel did make a perfunctory invocation 
of the principle that the choice between rulemaking and adjudi-
cation lies in the first instance with the agency.'· But there is no 
evidence of any intent on the part of the court to give this prin-
ciple any actual weight, and the concept of judicial deference to 
administrative judgment is not mentioned in the opinion. 
Just as legislatures are presumed to have acted rationally, 
administrative agencies must be presumed to have acted within 
the scope of their discretion. This principle is material and ba-
sic. As the Court in Chenery II declared: "The scope of our re-
view of an administrative order wherein a new principle is an-
nounced and applied is no different from that which pertains to 
ordinary administrative action. The wisdom of the principle 
adopted is none of our concern. Our duty is at an end when it 
becomes evident that the Commission's action is based upon 
substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority granted 
by Congress. "'711 
The Francis Ford court did not examine the statutory lan-
guage or legislative history to determine what the proper scope 
of the FTC's discretion to proceed by adjudication might be in 
light of those controlling considerations. Yet the. structure and 
purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act and its amend-
ments clearly indicate that the FTC has been empowered with 
broad discretion to proceed by adjudication in enforcing the 
Act.'6 
74. 673 F.2d 1008, 1009. 
75. 332 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted). 
76. This footnote will proceed chronologically through the FTCA and its amend-
ments in demonstrating that Congress empowered the FTC with broad discretion to pro-
ceed by adjudication in enforcing the Act. 
A. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 
Section 5 of the original FTCA read: "unfair methods of competition in commerce 
are hereby declared unlawful." Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5,38 Stat. 717, 
719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976». Section 5 provides for hearings, and 
for the ability to issue cease and desist orders to impose fines. [d. Note that the FTC was 
to enforce not "rules made pursuant to the statutory authority," but the broad prohibi-
tion of unfair methods itself. 
13
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The court's analysis of whether adjudication was appropri-
The legislative history of the 1914 Act indicates that the FTC was designed to en-
force the Act specifically through adjudication. This is reflected in the fact that the FTC 
did not even attempt the issuance of a formal substantive rule until 1963. See 16 C.F.R. 
§ 400.1 (1975). See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
The congressional rationale for leaving the FTC without the explicit power to pro-
ceed through promulgation of legislative-type rules, and the rationale for not providing a 
definition of what constitutes unfair practices, are closely related: 
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair 
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this 
field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically de-
fined and prohibited it would at once be necessary to begin 
over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, 
it would undertake an endless task. It is also practically im-
possible to define unfair practices so that the definition will fit 
business of every sort in every part of the country. 
Joint Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). Accord S. 
REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). This rationale applies equally to congres-
sional definitions of unfair practices and to the Commission's definition of unfair prac-
tices through legislative-type rules, and is central to the FTC's statutory mission. 
B. The Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938 
The 1938 amendments enlarged the jurisdiction· of the FTC to include "unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in commerce," irrespective of whether such conduct injured 
competitors. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976». 
The chief purpose of the expansion of the FTC's jurisdiction was to supercede the 
Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). Raladam had 
held that section 5 was aimed at unfair methods of competition and therefore an adverse 
effect on competitors, not merely on consumers, was required under the Act as a requi-
site for FTC action. [d. at 654. The result was that if all the competitors in an industry 
practiced the same unfair methods, each would be immune from section 5. See Kintner 
& Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer 
Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651, 658 (1975). In adding the phrase "unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in commerce," Congress expanded the FTC's jurisdiction and 
reemphasized the purpose of the Act and Commission to protect consumers. 
Consider Francis Ford in light of Raladam: In Raladam the judiciary limited the 
FTC's enforcement power by ruling that if unfair methods did not tend to affect a com-
petitor's economic health, they were beyond the FTC's reach. This had the practical 
effect that where unfair practices had widespread application in an industry, so that 
adverse effects on competitors could not be demonstrated although adverse effects on 
consumers could be, the FTC, under Raladam, could not reach them. Under Francis 
Ford, where a business can show that its unfair practices have widespread application in 
an industry, and the remedy "changes existing law" (and what remedy for existing wide-
spread unfair practices which would be effective for a whole industry would not "change" 
law?), the FTC is precluded from proceeding by the only means allowed to it at the time 
of Raladam: adjudication. 
Yet Congress clearly rejected the Raladam thinking: 
Under the present [unamended] act, it has been intimated in 
court decisions that the Commission may lose jurisdiction of a 
case of deceptive and similar unfair practices if it should de-
velop in the proceeding that all competitors in the industry 
practiced the same methods . . .. Under the proposed 
14
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ate In the instant context-whether it had a reasonable ba-
amendment, the Commission would have jurisdiction to stop 
the exploitation or deception of the public, even though the 
competitors of the respondent are themselves entitled to no 
protection because of their engaging in similar practices. 
S. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). 
C. The Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Amendments of 1973 
These amendments worked a three-fold expansion of FTC authority. First, the max-
imum penalty for cease and desist order violations was doubled to $10,000. Second, the 
FTC could represent itself in federal courts if the Justice Department did not act. Third, 
the Commission could seek injunctive relief in court upon a reasonable belief that any 
law it enforced was being violated. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 
408, 87 Stat. 591, 591-92 (1973) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(m), 53 (g) & 56 
(1976». 
The purpose of these changes, especially the third, was to strengthen the FTC in its 
consumer protection role, and to allow it to proceed against potential violators even 
though they may have no prior cease and desist orders outstanding against them. See S. 
REP. No. 93-151, 93d Cong., lat. Sess. 9-10 (1973). Thus, the discretion of the FTC to 
proceed by adjudication was again confirmed. 
D. The FTC Improvement Act of 1975 
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act-Federal Trade Commission Act of 1975-ex-
tended the FTC's reach to matters "in or affecting" commerce, clarified and affirmed the 
FTC's power to promulgate trade regulation rules, and expanded the FTC's adjucative 
remedies to include actions for civil penalties and consumer restitution. Act of Jan. 4, 
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 201-206, 88 Stat. 2193, 2200 (1975). 
Section 18 of the FTCA confirmed the authority of the Commission to issue sub-
stantive rules, and made explicit the procedure for doing so. The legislative history 
shows that Congress candidly recognized that the FTC had been making rules without 
unambiguous authority since 1963, and sought to legitimize and formalize that practice, 
making its own changes in the process. But the conference report did not suggest that 
rulemaking was anything other than a complementary instrument to be used in conjunc-
tion with adjudication in filling in the interstices of the Act. There is some language in 
the House Report which suggests a preference for rulemaking over adjudication: 
Substantial sentiment has developed over the years that in 
many instances the desirable manner of implementing the 
broad standards of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act should be by means of rule-making with the com-
plaint-cease and desist order procedure used as a means of en-
forcing the rules. Rule-making offers the obvious advantages 
that (a) each person who could be affected by the proposed 
rule is afforded an opportunity to be heard on it in a well de-
fined and well understood procedure, (b) the rules are devel-
oped in advance of their application to any person or practice 
and apply with uniformity, and (c) judicial review of any rule 
is available as well as of the procedures used in adopting it. 
H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 7702, 7714. However, it would be clearly erroneous to bootstrap this legislative 
dicta into a general rule: the language appears only in a House Report, and thus cannot 
be said to represent the belief of the entire Congress. And the language itself is hardly 
conclusive-although it suggests that rulemaking would be appropriate "in many in-
stances," it fails to specify in which instances rulemaking is preferable to adjudication. 
The inescapable inference is that such determinations are to be made by the Commission 
itself. Nowhere does Congress suggest the FTC has abused its adjudicative authority in 
15
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sis-was founded on an apparent non sequitur. The court fo-
any case, nor that it wished to replace adjudication with rule making. Rather, the entire 
tenor of the legislative history indicates that the section 18 rulemaking power is to be 
viewed as an addition to the Commission's remedial armamentarium. The strongest sup-
port for this view lies in the fact that other legislative provisions added in 1975 markedly 
indicate that Congress intended to considerably expand the FTC's authority to proceed 
in the first instance through adjudication. 
Section 19 of the FTCA, Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637 § 206(a), 88 Stat. 
2~01, (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a) (1976», implements the theme of consumer 
protection in its most direct form, by providinjf for consumer money damages and other 
relief as an FTC remedy. It is inherent in Congress' structuring of this section that it 
contemplated the FTC would in its informed discretion proceed in some matters through 
rulemaking and others through adjudication. Section 19 provides for consumer redress 
actions to be brought by the FTC in two circumstances: (1) for violations of trade regula-
tion rules; and (2) where the FTC has proceeded against a party and the Commission 
had issued a final cease and desist order with regard to a practice which a reasonable 
man under the circumstances would have known was dishonest or fraudulent. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 57b(I), (2) (1976). It is crucial to note that redress is available not only for practices 
committed after the cease and desist order was issued, but for those practices resulting 
in a cease and desist order-such as that practice at issue in the Francis Ford 
adjudication. 
The second major expansion of the FTC's adjudicative authority was in the power to 
seek civil penalties. Previously, the FTC could only seek such penalties from parties. 
against whom a cease and desist order had become final. The FTC Improvement Act 
gave the FTC the power to seek civil penalties in two additional circumstances: (1) where 
a party has violated a trade regulation rule with actual or fairly imputed knowledge that 
the act is unfair or deceptive and prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(l)(a) (1976); and, (2) 
where the FTC has obtained a final cease and desist order against an act or practice, and 
where the party to the civil penalty action, who need not have been a party to the cease 
and desist order had actual knowledge that the act or practice was unfair or deceptive 
and unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(l)(b) (1976). 
The creation of the latter section quite clearly reveals that Congress intended that 
the FTC have the power to proceed against individual violators of section 5, as well as 
against violators of the trade regulation rules, and that in adjudicative proceedings 
against such violators could formulate adjudicative "rules" which, if other parties had 
knowledge of them, would apply against them with the same force as would the trade 
regulation rules. "[TJhe section seems to authorize rulemaking by adjudication." Kintner 
& Smith, supra, 26 MERCER L. REv. at 682. 
E. The FTC Improvement Act 011980 
The 1980 amendments made a number of important changes in rulemaking proce-
dure, including making trade regulation rules subject to congressional veto. Act of May 
28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21(a)-(h), 94 Stat. 376-379 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a 
(Supp. V 1981». 
The 1980 amendments grew out of congressional hearings into the overall operation 
of the FTC. From those comprehensive hearings one overriding congressional purpose 
arose: to prevent the FTC from overreaching in the area of rule making. Each of the 
examples provided in the Senate Report as "Background and Need for the Legislation" 
dealt with a case in which the FTC had, in the view of Congress, gone beyond its statu-
tory authority in the area of rulemaking. No similar criticism was leveled at the FTC's 
adjudicative activities. S. REP. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1102, 1102-1105. 
The legislative history of the 1980 amendments illuminates Congress' view of the 
wide scope and purpose of the FTC's discretion to proceed by adjudication rather than 
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cused on a pending rule making proceeding also relating to credit 
practices of auto dealers:" 
The pending rulemaking proceeding and this ad-
judication seek to remedy, more or less, the same 
credit practices. Although the former is directed 
against the practices, inter alia, of car dealers in 
their accounting of deficiencies, and the latter is 
directed against a car dealer by reason of his 
practices in failing to account for surpluses, both 
matters are covered by VCC § 9-504. If the rule 
for deficiencies is thought by the F.T.C. to be 
"appropriately addressed by rulemaking," it 
should also address the problem of accounting for 
surpluses by a rulemaking proceeding, and not by 
adjudication.78 
Aside from the court's inexact equation of two distinct 
credit practices (Francis Ford's practice of selling repossessed 
cars at retail and crediting consumers with only wholesale value 
is emphatically not "the same credit practice, more or less" as 
that of selling repossessed cars at wholesale and charging the 
consumer debtor with the resultant deficiency; the practices are 
mutually exclusive in any given case), the somewhat startling 
proposition that "appropriate for rulemaking" necessarily 
means "inappropriate for adjudication" is not explained or sup-
ported with authority by the Francis Ford court. Nor could the 
rulemaking. The Senate version of the amendments allowed the FTC to proceed with 
rulemaking only if it had .. 'reason to believe' that unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
. . . were 'prevalent'. Prevalence exists only if the Commission has iseued cease and de-
sist orders regarding acts and practices that are addressed by the rule, or if other infor-
mation available ... indicates a 'pattern' of unlawful conduct." Id. at 1121. Although 
this provision was later dropped as too restrictive of the Commiseion, the Conference 
Report indicated approval of its basic philosophy. Id. at 1147. And it appears, from the 
language indicating that the first way to establish prevalence was to proceed through 
discrete adjudication within the area of potential rulemaking, that Congrese intended 
that the FTC would use adjudication to develop its knowledge of areas for potential 
rulemaking, and that adjudication is a desirable and appropriate first step in dealing 
with practices which are widespread and not currently remedied in the law. Id. at 1121. 
F. Summary of the Statutory Inquiry 
The statutory structure and the legislative history of the FTCA and its amendments 
overwhelmingly indicate that the FTC has been empowered by Congrese with broad dis-
cretion to proceed by adjudication in enforcing section 5's broad prohibition against un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices. 
77. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975). 
78. 673 F.2d at 1010. 
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proposition be said to be a logical one. Yet it undercuts the re-
peated emphasis in all three Supreme Court decisions that there 
is to be broad agency discretion to be responsive to changing 
circumstances in the fields of regulatory expertise. 
The inquiry into whether the Francis Ford adjudication had 
a reasonable basis under the circumstances need not have been 
an exhaustive one. The unfair practice which formed the basis 
for the adjudications against nine companies, including Francis 
Ford, was that the auto dealers, in collusion with the auto com-
panies and their financing subsidiaries, had failed to credit con-
sumers who had their cars repossessed and resold by the dealers 
with the actual value the dealers received on resale. By consent 
agreement, the other eight companies agreed to return some $2 
million to consumers.79 The purpose and result of the adjudica-
tory proceedings was consumer redress. And as the legislative 
history of the FTCA and the language of section 19 unmistaka-
bly indicate, consumer protection in the form of consumer re-
dress actions based on cease and desist orders are specifically 
authorized by Congress, for the dual purposes of achieving con-
sumer redress in the instant case, and developing experience in 
an area which may serve as a prelude to formal rulemaking.80 
The argument that it is "unfair" to single out one violator, 
or a very few, for a practice followed by many, ignores both the 
fact that Francis Ford was required to adjudicate, not the prac-
tices of an industry as a whole, but merely its own practices. In 
addition, it overlooks the fact that Congress intends that the 
FTC have the option to develop experience with individual vio-
lators in a significant number of instances before a formal 
rulemaking proceeding is commenced.81 Far from an abuse of 
discretion, the Francis Ford adjudication, with its significant 
consumer redress results, may be close to an exemplar of the 
congressionally-intended FTC adjudication. 
4. The Balancing 
The next phase of the inquiry turns to the balancing of 
Chenery II and Bell Aerospace. (In Chenery II the balancing 
79. See supra note 14. 
SO. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(I), (2) (1976). See supra note 76. 
81. See supra note 76. 
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test was announced in the middle of the opinion;82 in Bell Aero-
space, it was the final consideration of the opinion.8S) The "ret-
roactive effect" of allowing the adjudication to stand-i.e., the 
undesirable consequence which might flow from application of 
the adjudicatory rule announced in a case of first administrative 
impression-is to be balanced against "the mischief of producing 
a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and 
equitable principles."8. 
The Francis Ford court failed to apply, or even recognize 
the existence of, the balancing test of Chenery II and Bell 
Aerospace. 
If the legislative history is sparse and ambiguous, as it 
might be with state statutes creating administrative agencies, or 
if an administrative agency has attempted to extend its reach 
through adjudication into unfamiliar areas of unclear jurisdic-
tion,811 then this phase of the inquiry into whether an agency has 
abused its discretion might be a critical, case-determinative one. 
But this was not the case in Francis Ford. 811.1 
The factors the Bell Aerospace Court looked to are illustra-
tive: Was there reliance by industry on agency decisions con-
trary to the new adjudicative rule?;88 Was the reliance if any jus-
tifiable and in good faith?;8" Are fines and damages to be 
imposed?88 These considerations point to possible adverse con-
sequences of retroactive effect. 
Applied to the facts of Francis Ford, these factors make an 
unconvincing case for finding an abuse of discretion. As the 
Francis Ford court admitted, there were no past FTC adjudica-
tions indicating a contrary result from this proceeding.89 Thus, 
there could not be any reliance at all upon nonexistent decisions, 
82. 332 U.S. at 203. 
83. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294-95. 
84. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 204. 
85. Ct. NLRB v. Insurance'Agents Int'. Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 447, 449 (1960). 
85.1 See supra note 76 for a discUB8ion of the history of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. 
86. 416 U.S. at 295. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. 673 F.2d at 1010. 
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let alone a justifiable, good faith reliance. And even where there 
might be such reliance, as the Bell Aerospace Court indicated 
might be the case regarding the NLRB's past decisions holding 
buyers to be non-managerial employees,80 the party against 
whom the adjudication would apply must show substantial ad-
verse consequences.81 
The Bell Aerospace Court's inquiry into fines or damages 
may be seen as another aspect of its concern with results which 
are both equitable and consistent with statutory purpose. In 
Francis Ford, as in Bell Aerospace, the punitive element of fines 
was not at issue; thus the anomaly of punitive damages resulting 
from good faith reliance was not present in either case. In the 
adjudication on which Francis Ford was based, the consent 
agreement had resulted in $2 million being paid back to consum-
ers who had been the targets of the unfair trade practice. These 
were not punitive in nature, but direct compensatory damages 
capable of fairly precise ascertainment in each case. The FTC 
sought in the adjudication similar damages in the form of direct 
consumer redress from Francis Ford. In this respect the remedy 
was similar to that approved by the Supreme Court in Chenery 
II, where members of corporate management who had traded in 
corporate stock during a reorganization were ordered to surren-
der their stock at cost-i.e., to forego the profit made on the 
transaction determined illegal, just as the companies in Francis 
Ford agreed to restitution for the profits they made from the 
unfair practice. Thus, the imposition of damages could not be 
said to weigh heavily against the allowance of adjudication in 
Francis Ford. . 
The final consideration is that of the mischief done by a re-
sult which is contrary to statutory design or legal and equitable 
principles. Because the result achieved in Francis Ford defeats 
the congressional intent, expressed in definite statutory design, 
to give the FTC the power to proceed by adjudication in enforc-
ing section 5, as a primary means of enforcement and as a devel-
opmental tool for formulating agency policy which may later re-
sult in formal rulemaking, the disallowance of adjudication is 
90. 416 U.S. at 295. 
91. [d. "It has not been shown that the adverse consequences ensuing from such 
reliance are so substantial that the Board should be precluded from reconsidering the 
issue in an adjudicative proceeding." [d. 
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contrary to statutory design. The decision defeats the congres-
sionally mandated goals of consumer protection from unfair 
trade practices, and consumer redress as a major remedy.91.1 The 
consumer victims of Francis Ford's unfair credit practices re-
main uncompensated for the definite harm they have suffered,92 
and Francis Ford and all other ·dealers remain apparently free to 
continue practices which have been adjudicated unfair, at least 
until the FTC promulgates a rule specifically governing such 
practices. The "result reached by the Ninth Circuit in the instant 
case is contrary to basic principles of fairness. 
5. Inadvertent irony 
Misusing precedent and allowing unresolved internal incon-
sistency in its opinion, the Francis Ford court promulgated and 
applied a dubious "generalized standard" without adequate sup-
port in the law. 
On the question of "drawing the line" for agency abuse of 
discretion, the Francis Ford court quoted Bell Aerospace: "It is 
doubtful whether any generalized standard could be framed 
which would have more than marginal utility."98 This quotation 
is clearly taken out of context by the Francis Ford court; in its 
original, it referred to generalized standards to determine 
whether buyers were managerial or non-managerial employees. 
The point the Bell Aerospace Court sought to make was that 
this would vary according to the duties of the buyers in each 
employment situation.9• It is not what the Francis Ford court 
91.1 See supra note 76. 
92. Hypothetically, of course, each consumer wrongfully dellied a surplus could sue 
to recover under state law. However, the sums involved from each consumer, generally 
only a few hundred dollars, and the probable lack of knowledge on the part of consumers 
of this particular accounting practice, make this remedy unlikely to be pursued, and 
ineffective as a general remedy. 
93. 673 F.2d at 1009, quoting Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294. 
94. The passage in which the "marginal utility" language appears is as follows: 
As the Court of Appeals noted, "[tlhere must be tens of 
thousands of manufacturing, wholesale and retail units which 
employ buyers, and hundreds of thousands of the latter." 475 
F.2d at 496. Moreover, duties of buyers vary widely depending 
on the company or industry. It is doubtful whether any gener-
alized standard could be framed which would have more than 
marginal utility. The Board thus has reason to proceed with 
caution, developing its standards in a case-by-case manner 
with attention to the specific character of the buyers' author-
ity and duties in each company. 
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took it to be, a statement about the doubtful wisdom of making 
general rules regarding the choice between rulemaking and adju-
dication. But in the context in which the Ninth Circuit panel 
misquoted the statement, it is inadvertently ironic. 
The irony-and the internal inconsistency-arises in that 
after reciting that generalized standards regarding the choice be-
tween rule making and adjudication have marginal utility, a 
scant two paragraphs later the Francis Ford court framed such a 
generalized standard, and applied it. "Framed according to 
Patel, the precise issue therefore is whether this adjudication 
changes existing law, and has widespread application. It does, 
and the matter should be addressed by rulemaking."911 This test, 
drawn from an entirely different regulatory field, immigration, 
and applied to the FTC, is transparently a generalized standard 
of the sort the court inveighed against two paragraphs earlier. 
6. Sub rosa repudiation of precedent 
The "generalized standard" of Francis Ford is inconsistent 
with Wyman-Gordon and Bell Aerospace and, if allowed to 
stand, would effect a sub rosa repudiation of Chenery II. 
In Bell Aerospace, the adjudication in question "changed 
existing law" in that prior to 1970, a long line of cases had con-
sistently excluded buyers from NLRA coverage. The Supreme 
Court nevertheless ruled that the agency could adjudicatively 
determine that buyers were capable of being non-managerial." 
And the change at issue had "widespread application": no com-
pany was exempt from the possibility that its buyers would be 
classed as non-managerial and thus accorded bargaining rights. 
Even though the determination of buyers' status was to be made 
under a case by case application, the rule itself applied to all.97 
In Wyman-Gordon, eight Justices would have upheld the 
Excelsior "rule" against the Wyman-Gordon Company, had it 
been applied in the original adjudication against the Excelsior 
416 U.S. at 294. 
95. 673 F.2d at 1010. 
96. 416 U.S. at 290. 
97. See supra note 94. 
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Underwear· Company.98 The adjudicative rule in that case 
"changed existing law" in the sense that previously, there had 
been no requirement that an employer could be compelled to 
furnish a list of employees to the union, but thereafter the 
Board could so mandate. And the new rule was to have "wide-
spread application"-to apply to all employers. 
In Chenery II, the Supreme Court held adjudication appro-
priate for formulation of a policy regarding management trading 
in corporate stock during corporate reorganizations. This was 
clearly a rule of widespread application: it applied to all corpo-
rate officers of publicly-held corporations undergoing reorganiza-
tions. And at least to the extent that there was no law prohibit-
ing the practice previously,99 the adjudication "changed existing 
law" in the exact sense that the action against Francis Ford for 
practices which had not previously been proscribed by the FTC 
"changed existing law." The "generalized standard" of Francis 
Ford is facially inconsistent with Chenery II. Francis Ford must 
therefore be understood as a sub rosa repudiation of that deci-
sion on its own terms. 
It might, of course, be argued that the Chenery II adjudica-
tive rule did not "change existing law" because there was no 
prior SEC regulation on the subject. Even accepting this argu-
ment however, there is a thin distinction left for Francis Ford: 
there was no prior FTC law on the subject of the adjudication, 
but there was existing state law (UCC 9_504).100 But to find that 
the FTC adjudication changed existing state law is perforce to 
assume, as did the Francis Ford court without so stating, that 
the FTC has the power to "change" existing state law. Of course 
it does not. 
7. The problem of "existing law" 
The "generalized standard" of Francis Ford has severe 
workability problems; the requirement that the adjudication not 
"change existing law" is problematical in the extreme. It re-
quires a determination that may often be quite difficult. Profes-
sor Davis spoke to a closely related point: "An impossible line to 
98. 394 U.S. at 765, 775. 
99. 332 U.S. at 200-01. 
100. 673 F.2d at 1010. 
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draw is the theoretical one between creating new law through 
interpretation and discovering the meaning that is already there; 
the line cannot be drawn because the two items commonly 
overlap. "101 
An illustration of the problem is that one could very plausi-
bly argue that what the FTC attempted to do in Francis Ford 
was not to change existing law, but rather to change its inter-
pretation of existing law. This comports with the traditional un-
derstanding of agency adjudicative proceedings as quasi-judicial 
and agency rulemaking proceedings as quasi-legislative: what 
courts do in interpreting statutes is not to "change law" - it is 
to interpret the law that already exists. Administrative agencies 
such as the FTC, interpreting statutes through adjudication, do 
not "change existing law" any more than courts do through stat-
utory interpretation. 
It may be forecast with assurance that the Francis Ford test 
in application will lead to inconsistent results: what is one 
judge's "change in existing law" will quite likely be another's 
"clarification." In many cases the determination, instead of 
lending greater certainty to the law, will be, or seem, arbitrary. 
Professor Davis had drawn perhaps the most useful line be-
tween what is a change in existing law and what is not. Ironi-
cally, the Francis Ford panel cited his views in support of the 
proposition that "courts should require agencies to use rulemak-
ing procedures when the agency retroactively adopts new law or 
where the parties have relied on the precedents."102 But it is ap-
parent from a review of the cited material that what Professor 
Davis contemplated by this concept were those situations where 
an agency "changes a former rule"I03 and where an "agency 
through adjudication makes a change in clear law, as when it 
overrules a batch of its own decisions. "104 Where, as in Francis 
Ford, there was no prior rule changed or batch of decisions over-
ruled - i.e., there was no retroactive change in settled law -
Professor Davis' concept would not apply on its own terms. 
Neither the FTC nor any court had ruled that Francis Ford's 
101. 2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 7:25, at 155 (1980) (emphasis added). 
102. 673 F.2d at 1009, quoting 2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, § 7:25, at 124 (1980). 
103. 2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 7:25, at 124 (1980). 
104. [d. at 122. 
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credit practices or similar ones were not violative of the FTCA. 
The basis on which the Francis Ford court determined that the 
dealer had not violated existing Oregon law, VCC 9-504, was 
specious: the court found that since no Oregon court had held 
these practices violative of the Oregon enactment of the VCC, 
Francis Ford could not be held in violation of existing state 
law. 1011 But the court admitted that Oregon courts had never had 
the question before them.loe Necessarily, therefore, it cannot be 
held that there was prior existing law on the question which the 
FTC sought to "change." Rather, there was no prior law on the 
subject whatsoever. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Administrative agencies exist because they are uniquely 
able to develop and implement expert judgment in specialized 
fields, in a manner beyond the capability of courts of general 
jurisdiction. In order to function effectively, agencies must be 
free to develop expertise, and able, within the bounds of due 
process, to implement judgments based on that special compe-
tence. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Francis Ford adversely 
strikes at both aspects of this general idea. 
Agencies develop judgment in a field through actual experi-
ence dealing with individual violators. It is manifest that, for ex-
ample, Congress intended the FTC to utilize individual adminis-
trative adjudications in particular areas in exploring whether the 
making of formal legislative rules was feasible and desirable. l07 
This article has demonstrated that, under the rule of Fran-
cis Ford, agencies may not safely rely on adjudication as a key 
means by which to develop knowledge within areas of potential 
rulemaking. Those violators whose unfair or deceptive practices 
seem widespread and are arguably not remedied in existing in-
terpretations of the applicable statutes, are placed beyond the 
effective reach of administrative adjudication in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Agencies may not develop expertise with such violators. 
Deprived of a critical means of developing administrative 
105. 673 F.2d at 1010. 
106. [d. 
107. See supra note 76. 
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expertise, agencies must resort to other means. They must rely 
on the techniques of formal rule making-the second-hand expe-
rience of administrative hearings, rather than the direct knowl-
edge that springs from dealing with suspected violators. The net 
result is decreased agency effectiveness. The net loss is the 
public's. 
In contrast, the four-part inquiry which courts reviewing an 
agency choice of adjudication must perform in following Che-
nery II and Bell Aerospace does not artificially limit the scope 
of administrative discretion. Rather, the Supreme Court's tested 
analytic methodology utilizes familiar equitable concepts in light 
of legislative intent and the circumstances of the particular case. 
Because the Ninth Circuit's novel approach is both an un-
justified departure from tested principles of review, and analyti-
cally unsound, Francis Ford should be overruled at the earliest 
opportunity. lOB 
ARONSEN V. CROWN ZELLERBACH: UNDERSTANDING 
PERPLEXING ADEA PROCEDURES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Aronsen u. Crown Zellerbach, 1 the Ninth Circuit held 
that a grievant bringing an action under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA),I in a deferral state,3 has 300 days 
108. Judge Reinhardt, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit's denial of rehearing en 
bane, suggested that the Francis Ford decision might be limited in future cases to situa-
tions in which the adjudicative rule could have been addressed in a contemporaneous 
rulemaking process which dealt with separate but related matters. 673 F.2d at 1012 n.2. 
However, as this article has demonstrated, there is little in the reasoning of the Francis 
Ford opinion which suggests to potential litigants that the Ninth Circuit would consider 
the applicability of its "generalized standard" to be limited to such situations. "Ulti-
mately, however, we are persuaded to set aside this order because the rule of the case 
made below will have general application," wrote the Ninth Circuit judges. 673 F.2d at 
1010. 
1. 662 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Tang, J.; other panel memebers were Pregerson, 
J. and Kelleher, D.J., sitting by designation, concurring), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1183 
(1983). 
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970) amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
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in which to file notice of intent to sue.4 The court further held 
that a grant of summary judgment had been inappropriate be-
cause a material issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff 
knew or should have known that he was a victim of an unlawful 
practice. In so holding, the court announced a method to deter-
mine when an unlawful practice occurs. II 
The plaintiff, age fifty-two, was terminated by the defen-
dant after twenty-eight years of employment with the company.s 
He alleged that the sole basis for his termination was defen-
dant's general plan to replace employees nearing retirement with 
younger employees.' Plaintiff claimed that his last day with the 
company was April 21, 1976 and that he gave notice of intent to 
sue to the Secretary of Labor on January 19, 1977, approxi-
mately 270 days later.8 
The defendant argued that on March 31, 1975, plaintiff was 
informed of his pending termination and given a choice between 
taking a demotion or accepting the termination and staying with 
the company during a transition period.s Plaintiff remained on 
the payroll until March 31, 1976.10 He received payments for ac-
cumulated benefits until April 21, 1976.11 
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978). 
3. A deferral state is one in which state law exists prohibiting age discrimination 
and an agency is authorized to grant or seek relief on behalf of the grievant. See The 
Procedural Requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9 
RUTGERS CAMDEN L. REV. 540, 550 (1978). 
4. The Aronsen opinion noted a change in the relevant statute since the case in 
question was heard: 
In 1978, this section was amended so that only a "charge 
alleging unlawful discrimination" need be tiled. According to 
the legislative history of this amendment, the charge require-
ment is satistied by a written statement identifying the poten-
tial defendant and describing generally the action believed to 
be discriminatory. The change from "notice of intent to sue" 
to "charge" was not intended to alter the basic purpose of the 
prior law. 
662 F.2d at 587 n.3. (Citations omitted). 
5. Id. at 593-94. 
6. Id. at 585. 
7.Id. 
8.Id. 
9. Id. at 586. 
10.Id. 
11. Id. at 585. 
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The date of termination was pivotal to an ADEA claim 
since March 31, 1975 was far outside the 300 day filing limit, 
while March 31, 1976 or April 21, 1976 were within the period 
allowed. The district court held that March 31, 1975 was the ap-
plicable date of termination. It reasoned that it was on that date 
that plaintiff knew he was being terminated, and ceased his ac-
tive employment with the company. The court dismissed the 
complaint because it was not filed within 300 days of March 31, 
1975.11 The appeal was based on the factual dispute over the 
date of termination. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Statutory Filing Period 
The statutory language of 29 U.S.C. section 626(d)18 does 
not expressly mandate resort to a deferral state's own remedy as 
a prerequisite to a private action under ADEA. As a result there 
has been considerable controversy over whether initiation of 
state proceedings is optional.14 Since the grievant must give no-
tice of intent to sue within the applicable 180 or 300 day period 
12. [d. 
13. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976) as in effect at the time of plaintiff's suit provided: 
(d) No civil action may be commenced by any individual 
under this section until the individual has given the Secretary 
not le88 than sixty days' notice of an intent to file such action. 
Such notice shall be filed-
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged 
unlawful practice occurred, or 
(2) in a ~e to which section 633(b) of this title applies, 
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful practice 
occurred or within thirty days after receipt by the individual 
of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, 
whichever is earlier. Upon receiving a notice of intent to sue, 
the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons named therein 
as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly 
seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal 
methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion. 
See note 16 infra for text of 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976). 
14. See Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981) (grievant need not 
file with the state in order to preserve a federal action); Ciccone v. Textron, Inc., 616 
F.2d 1216 (lst Cir. 1980) (state proceeding must be commenced within 180 days to pre-
serve a federal action), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 
664 F.2d 884 (1981); Ewald v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 620 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 
1980) (grievant must file with the state agency to preserve a federal action), vacated and 
remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981). rev'd and remanded, 664 F.2d 884 (1981); Bean v. Crock-
er Nat'! Bank, 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (grievant need not file with the state to 
preserve a federal action). 
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after the alleged act of discrimination, courts have struggled to 
define whether filing within 180 days is also necessary in a defer-
ral state to preserve the 120 day extention. The Supreme Court 
has not made a decision which directly controls the issue. Conse-
quently, circuit courts have extrapolated language and reasoning 
used by the Court in deciding issues closely related to section 
626(d).111 
Section 633(b)18 applies when a complaint is filed in a defer-
ral state. Interpreting this section, the Supreme Court, in Oscar 
Mayer & Co. v. Evans,17 held that grievants must resort to state 
administrative proceedings before bringing suit in federal 
court.18 The Court also held that commencement of these pro-
ceedings need not be timely under state law in order to preserve 
a private federal right under ADEA.19 
The Evans decision concerned the relationship between 
filing a federal suit and commencing a state action, rather than 
that between commencing a state action and filing a federal no-
tice of intent to sue. The Court gave no direct answer as to 
whether a grievant must commence a state action within 180 
days as a prerequisite to filing a federal notice.IIO The decision 
15. See supra note 14. 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
(b) In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in 
a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State 
authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory 
practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title 
before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been 
commenced under the State law, unleBB such proceedings have 
been earlier terminated: Provided, That such sixty-day period 
shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the 
first year after the effective date of such State law. If any re-
quirement for the commencement of such proceeding is im-
posed by a State authority other than a requirement of the 
filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon 
which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed 
to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at 
the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the ap-
propriate State authority. 
17. 441 U.S. 750 (1979). 
18. Id. at 758. 
19. Id. at 753. 
20. The Court merely noted that provisions of Title VII require filing with state 
agencies first, and that filing under ADEA is different: "Under the ADEA, by contrast, 
grievants may file with state and federal agencies simultaneously." 441 U.S. at 756. 
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did, however, give lower courts a tool to use in interpreting 
ADEA language, and hence section 626, by stating that analogies 
to similar provisions in Title VII are appropriate.21 
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Olson u. Rembrandt Print-
ing CO.22 has been extensively relied upon by the circuits in in-
terpreting Title VII filing provisions, and ADEA provisions by 
analogy. In Olson the complainant filed a discrimination charge 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
more than 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice. She did 
not institute a state proceeding. The court held that in a defer-
ral state, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed 
with the state agency within 180 days in order to trigger the 300 
day filing period with the EEOC.28 
.. ADEA grievants may file with the State before or after they file with the Secretary of 
Labor." [d. at 756 n.4. 
21. The Evans Court analogized § 14(b) of ADEA (29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1979» to § 
706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976): 
Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, 
the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, since the 
language of § 14(b) is almost in haec verba with § 706(c), and 
since the legislative history of § 14(b) indicates that its source 
was § 706(c) , we may properly conclude that Congress in-
tended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that of § 
706(c). 
441 U.S. at 756. The analogous Title VII provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) 
provides: 
(c) In the case of an alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, 
which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful em-
ployment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a 
State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such prac-
tice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto 
upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under 
subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before 
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been com-
menced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings 
have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day pe-
riod shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during 
the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. 
If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings 
is imposed by a State or local authority other than a require-
ment of the filing of a written and signed statement of the 
facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall 
be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this 
subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered 
mail to the appropriate State or local authority. 
22. 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975). 
23. [d. at 1233. 
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In determining whether filing of a state grievance within 180 
days is optional, the Evans Court offered conflicting guidance. 
Thus, the dilemma of the circuits has been one of interpretation. 
On one hand, the Court stressed the identical purpose and lan-
guage of ADEA and Title VII provisions, thereby encouraging 
analogy between the two.u On the other hand, it noted the in-
herant difference in regard to jurisdiction between ADEA and 
Title VII since unlike Title VII, ADEA permits concurrent state 
and federal jurisdiction in order to aid older citizens who have 
fewer productive years remaining. 21! 
In Bean v. Crocker National Bank,26 the Ninth Cicuit held 
that in deferral states ADEA grievants have 300 days in which 
to file with the Secretary of Labor.2'1 Bean interpreted Evans to 
mean that, while a grievant must resort to appropriate state 
remedies, compliance with applicable state procedures need only 
occur sixty days prior to a federal suit. Bean reasoned that since 
the only stated requirement in Evans was filing with the agency 
prior to a federal suit, it was not logical to infer that the grievant 
meet the 180 day deadline as a prerequisite to a federal right.28 
The Bean court specifically rejected the application of the Olson 
approach in Title VII filing matters to ADEA complaints.29 
Following Bean, two circuits examined both the language of 
the statute and the Evans decision and reached a contrary con-
clusion. The First Circuit in Ciccone v. Textron30 and the Sixth 
Circuit in Ewald v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea CO.31 held that 
filing with a state agency within 180 days is a prerequisite to 
24. 441 U.S. at 756. 
25. [d. at 757. 
26. 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979). 
27. [d. at 758. 
28. [d. at 758-59. 
29. [d. at 758. The Bean Court asserted that in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Evans, the Olson reasoning relating to Title VII claims does not apply to filing 
limitation periods under the ADEA. Bean reasoned that since the Supreme Court held in 
Evans that state limitation periods are irrelevant for purposes of commencing state pro-
ceedings in relationship to commencing federal actions, compliance with state time limi-
tations in a deferral state must also be deemed irrelevant for purposes of determining 
whether a complainant has 180 or 300 days to file notice of intent to sue with the Secre-
tary. [d. at 759. 
30. 616 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981), rev'd 
and remanded, 651 F.2d 1 (1981). 
31. 620 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981), rev'd 
and remanded, 644 F.2d 884 (1981). 
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federal filing. 82 These courts reasoned that: first, a literal reading 
of the statute underestimates the intent of the legislature;88 and 
second, that analogies to Title VII in Evans provide the proper 
approach to similar ADEA provisions.84 Both cases specifically 
declined to follow Bean. 811 
Looking at the language of the statute, the Ewald court op-
posed a "casual" reading,88 while the Ciccone court warned 
against reading the statute "simplistically".87 Both opinions rea-
soned that where section 633(b) applies, it does so on the condi-
tion that "the complainant has diligently sought a state rem-
edy."88 Neither found an arbitrary award of 120 days to 
claimants who happen to reside in a deferral state in keeping 
with their reading of congessional goals. Ciccone argued that: 
The evident purpose of the extended filing period 
is to give the plaintiff a grace period within which 
to pursue state remedies he has invoked before 
being compelled to institute a federal charge. This 
purpose would in no way be furthered by provid-
ing a windfall of 120 days to plaintiffs living in 
deferral states even though they had not insti-
tuted a charge with the state agency within the 
initial filing period. a, 
In addition the First and Sixth Circuits relied on analogies 
to Title VII provisions-an approach taken by the Evans Court. 
Using the Olson formula, i.e., a grievant obtains the extended 
filing period in a deferral state only if the state mechanism has 
been used within 180 days, these circuits ruled against grievants 
who had not filed within the applicable 180 day period.40 
In a decision after Evans, the Supreme Court unraveled 
32. 616 F.2d at 1221; 620 F.2d at 1187. 
33. 616 F.2d at 1220; 620 F.2d at 1186. 
34. 616 F.2d at 1220; 620 F.2d at 1187. 
35. 616 F.2d at 1221; 620 F.2d at 1186. 
36. 620 F.2d at 1186. 
37. 616 F.2d at 1220. 
38. [d.; see also 620 F.2d at 1186. 
39. 616 F.2d at 1220-21. 
40. See Silver v. Mohaaco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1087 (2d Cir. 1979) (300 days to 
file), rev'd on other grounds, Mohaaco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Doski v. M. 
Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1330-33 (1976). In Wiltshire v. Standard Oil Co., 652 F.2d 
837,839 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982), the Ninth Circuit rejected 
Olson and found that 300 days waa the proper time limit. 
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much of the confusion over appropriate filing periods in deferral 
states. The Court held, in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,4! that a 
grievant bringing a claim with the EEOC in a deferral state has 
300 days to file; however, state proceedings must terminate sixty 
days prior to the EEOC commencing any action.42 
Mohasco is important to the resolution of controversies sur-
rounding ADEA filing periods because of the Court's disagree-
ment with the Eighth Circuit's approach in Olson to filing limi-
tations and its application in the Ciccone and Ewald decisions.43 
Mohasco objected to the restrictive approach in which a com-
plainant under all circumstances must file with either the state 
or federal agencies within 180 days. Mohasco stated that a court 
should not read in a time limitation provision that Congress has 
not seen fit to include.44 The Court thereafter vacated and re-
manded both Ciccone and Ewald for consideration consistent 
with the reasoning of Mohasco.411 
Determination of the Occurrence of an Unlawful Practice 
Disputes over whether or not a grievant has filed within the 
allotted period often focus on the date the unlawful practice oc-
curred. It is on this day that the applicable time limitation be-
gins to run. Since determining exactly when a grievant has been 
subjected to an unlawful practice may be difficult, courts have 
devised methods to assist this process. 
41. 447 U.S. 807 (1980). 
42. [d. at 814 n.16. Mohasco thus adopts the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Ti-
tle VII filing periods in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972). Mohasco 
notes: 
Under the Moore decision, which we adopt today, a complain-
ant in a deferral State having a fair employment practices 
agency over one year old need only file his charge within 240 
days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice in or-
der to insure that his federal rights will be preserved. If a 
complainant files later than· that (but not more than 300 days 
after the practice complained 00, his right to seek relief under 
Title VII will nonetheless be preserved if the State happens to 
complete its consideration of the charge prior to the end of the 
300-day period. 
447 U.S. at 814 n.16. 
43. 447 U.S. at 816 n.19. 
44. [d. 
45. 449 U.S. 914 (1981). Upon further consideration both decisions were reversed by 
the circuit courts. 651 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981); 644 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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The Third Circuit in Bonham u. Dresser Industries48 ruled 
that where unequivocal notice of termination coincides with the 
employee's last day of work, the unlawful practice will be 
deemed to have occurred and the filing period begins to run.47 
The Eighth Circuit attempted to devise a clearcut standard in 
Moses u. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,48 concluding that the official 
termination date as it appeared in company personnel records 
was the date on which the filing period began to run.49 
The Supreme Court in Delaware State College u. Ricksr.o 
announced a rationale that differed from both Bonham and 
Moses. Ricks involved a dispute in a Title VII action. The peti-
tioner was denied tenure by the employer and given a termina-
ble one-year contract. Although the petitioner claimed that the 
filing period began to run when the terminable contract expired, 
the Supreme Court did not agree, holding that the unlawful act 
of discrimination occurred when the "tenure decision was made 
and communicated to Ricks."r.1 Thus the Supreme Court an-
nounced a subjective method for determining the actual occur-
rence of an unlawful act. The grievant's knowledge that an un-
lawful practice has taken place will be the crucial element in 
initiating the time period in which to seek redress. 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Statutory Filing Period 
In deciding Aronsen, the Ninth Circuit first addressed the 
issue of the appropriate statutory filing period in an ADEA ac-
tion. The statute provides that a grievant file notice of intent to 
sue within 180 days of the alleged violation, or within 300 days 
in a deferral state. The court noted that in Bean the Ninth Cir-
cuit had construed the requirement time in a deferral state to be 
300 days.r.2 However, the defendant urged the court to recon-
46. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). 
47. 569 F.2d at 191. 
48. 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975). 
49. [d. at 94. 
50. 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
51. [d. at 258. The Court found support for this conclusion in the Ninth Circuit case 
of Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202 (1979). Abramson held that "[tJhe 
proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the 
consequences of the acts became most painful." 1d. at 209 (emphasis added). 
52. See Bean, 600 F.2d 754, 756. 
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sider its position in light of the contrary circuit court decisions 
in Ewald and Ciccone. In reaffirming the Ninth Circuit's stand 
on this issue, the Aronsen court examined the plain language of 
the statute, recalled its prior reasoning in Bean, and considered 
and dispensed with the interpretations of ADEA filing periods 
advanced by other circuits. 
Examining the words used by Congress to enact this legisla-
tion, the court found that the statute explicitly states that griev-
ants have 300 days in which to file an ADEA action.1I3 Section 
626(d)(2) indicates that where section 633(b) applies (com-
plaints filed in a deferral state) 300 days is allotted. The court 
saw no reason to depart from this plain congressional language. 54 
Second, the court reiterated the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Bean. The Bean analysis relied heavily on the Supreme Court in 
Evans. Bean extended the Evans rationale-that state limita-
tions are irrelevant for purposes of commencing state proceed-
ings in ADEA actions-to further indicate that state limitations 
were also irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a com-
plainant has 180 or 300 days in which to file notice of intent to 
sue.1I1I 
The Aronsen court found the plain language of the statute, 
and the analysis of the code in Bean, sufficient to support its 
refusal to change the Ninth Circuit position. However, in an ef-
fort to fully dispense with the controversy stemming from other 
circuit decisions, the court examined the aspects of these deci-
sions which it found to be unpersuasive.1I8 
The court opposed the conclusion reached by the Ewald 
and Ciccone decisions that the legislative purpose of section 
626(d) required that the plain language of the statute not be 
controlling, and that the statute be construed consistent with 
the intention of Congress. The Aronsen court did not agree with 
reasoning that would discern from legislative history a procedure 
which is more restrictive than a plain reading of the statute's 
53. See supra note 13 for applicable statutory language. 
54. 662 F.2d 584, 588. 
55. 600 F.2d 754, 759. 
56. 662 F.2d 584, 588-90. 
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text. II? 
Although the court found little direction in the record re-
garding the 1967 enactment of ADEA section 626(d), the court 
noted that the history behind the 1978 amendment of this sec-
tion revealed no ambiguity about filing periods in deferral states: 
Section 7(d) of the Act requires that an individual 
must give the Department of Labor notice of in-
tent to file suit within 180 days after the alleged 
unlawful practice occurs. This period is extended 
to 300 days where the alleged unlawful practice 
occurs in a state which has an age discrimination 
statute which provides a remedy.''' 
The Aronsen court thus found that the statutory history 
and language were clear and that the construction given to 
626(d) by other circuits imposed time restrictions "patently ab-
sent"119 from the language used by Congress. 
Finally, the court objected to arguments offered by the First 
and Sixth Circuits which relied on restrictive interpretation of 
similar language in Title VII. The court noted that although 
analogies to Title VII are validated by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Evans, disputes have consistently existed on the issue 
of whether a grievant must commence a state proceeding within 
180 days in order to preserve the 300 days for federal filing. 
While Ewald and Ciccone relied on the Olson court's interpreta-
tion, other circuits did not agree.80 
The court was further satisfied that the Supreme Court's 
57. The Aronsen opinion noted: 
In interpreting statutes, we are not free to substitute leg-
islative history for the language of the statute. Statutory inter-
pretation must begin with the statute itself. The court in Cic-
cone inverted this process. Although there is no per se bar 
preventing resort to legislative history even when the statute, 
as here, is plain on its face, we question Ciccone's reliance on 
legislative history to restrict access to the federal courts by 
imposing time restraints patently absent from and contrary to 
the statute's text. 
662 F.2d at 588 n.7 (citations omitted). 
58. [d. at 589, quoting H.R. CON'. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 523-24. 
59. 622 F.2d at 588 n.7. 
60. [d. at 589. 
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decision in Mohasco, in which the Olson approach was openly 
disapproved, resolved the disagreement regarding the proper in-
terpretation of filing periods.Bl The Mohasco court cited Ciccone 
as following substantially the same reasoning as Olson and 
therefore equally in error.Bt Aronsen concluded that both Ewald 
and Ciccone could not be used as persuasive authority in the 
Ninth Circuit, and thereby reaffirmed its position in Bean that 
in deferral states, grievants have 300 days in which to file their 
charges.Bs 
Determination of the Occurrence of an Unlawful Practice 
The Aronsen court held that a material issue of fact was in 
dispute at the time of the district court's decision. There had 
been no conclusive determination of when the plaintiff was actu-
ally terminated for purposes of establishing when the filing pe-
riod began to run. The court also announced a procedure for de-
termining when the alleged unlawful practice occurred based on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware State College v. 
Ricks.B• 
The district court had relied on Bonham v. Dresser Indus-
triesB6 in making its decision, and had rejected Moses v. Falstaff 
Brewing Co. BB The Ninth Circuit briefly examined these holdings 
and found that the objective standards outlined in Bonham (re-
ceipt of written notice and cessation of work), or Moses (termi-
nation on personnel records), were useful but not satisfactory. 
The Aronsen court concluded that the case-by-case method ad-
vanced in Ricks was the better approach.B7 
Aronsen construed the Ricks holding to mean that the 
plaintiff's knowledge that he or she had been the victim of an 
unlawful practice is the central factor in determining when the 
unlawful practice occurred.Bs Aronsen thus held that the appli-
cable filing period begins to run when the grievant knew or 
61. Id. at 590. 
62.Id. 
63. Id. at 590-91. 
64. 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980). 
65. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). 
66. 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975). 
67. 662 F.2d 584, 593-94. 
68. Id. at 593. 
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should have known that an unlawful practice had occurred, and 
that this knowledge could be based on a number of factors in-
cluding notice, termination or work and personal records. The 
factual situations in each case must therefore be determined.69 
D. CRITIQUE 
The first issue in Aronsen presented a simple question: in a 
deferral state, how many days does a claimant have in which to 
file a notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of Labor? The 
Ninth Circuit had previously addressed and dispensed with this 
issue in Bean, but the First and Sixth Circuit's express disagree-
ment with Bean's statutory interpretation challenged the court 
to reaffirm its position. 
Under the Ewald and Ciccone holdings, it was necessary for 
the grievant to file with a state agency within 180 days in order 
to qualify for, or preserve, the additional 120 days in which to 
file with the Department of Labor. These courts analogized to 
Title VII in reaching their decisions, relying heavily on Olson. 
However, at the time Aronsen was decided, the Aronsen panel 
was aware that the Supreme Court had summarily vacated both 
Ciccone and Ewald for further consideration in light of 
Mohasco. 70 The Ninth Circuit decison on the issue of proper 
filing periods was thus of questionable length and complexity 
since Mohasco, by rejecting the Olson approach, and by equat-
ing Ciccone with Olson, undercut the force of the Ciccone and 
Ewald holdings. A concise affirmation of Bean, supported by the 
Mohasco opinion, making special note of the remand of both 
Ewald and Ciccone, would therefore have been sufficient. 
69. 662 F.2d at 594. The court also noted that the doctrine of equitable modification 
may affect the tolling period on an ADEA action. See Naton v. Bank of California, 649 
F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981). Such modifications are of two types: the first, equitable tolling, 
is based on the excusable ignorance of the plaintiff; the second, equitable estoppel, fo-
cuses on actions of the defendant which mislead the plaintiff and thereby induce him to 
delay filing of notice of intent to sue. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 
1976), aff'd by equally divided Court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977). 
To determine whether equitable relief is warranted, a case-by-case review of the fac-
tual circumstances is necessary. Naton, 649 F.2d at 696. The Aronsen court concluded 
that further factual development was needed to resolve the issue of equitable modifica-
tion, and therefore the grant of summary judgment to defendant was also reversible on 
this basis. 662 F.2d at 595. 
70. See supra note 45. 
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The Aronsen court provides some clear guidance on the sec-
ond question of how an occurrence of an unlawful employment 
practice should be identified. The court articulated a new 
method for pinpointing the unlawful practice by adopting the 
rule announced by the Supreme Court in Ricks. The Ricks ap-
proach involves two elements: the unlawful practice, and the 
employee's knowledge of its occurrence. When both of these ele-
ments are fulfilled, the filing period begins to run. 
As Aronsen points out, this approach is not an objective, 
clear-cut standard. Rather, the approach is subjective since it fo-
cuses on the employee's knowledge to determine when the filing 
period begins. It is a fair standard for two reasons. First, it dis-
courages employers from failing to inform employees of federal 
employment guarantees because the employee's lack of knowl-
edge would simply prolong the availability of a remedy. Second, 
it encourages employees to file their grievance as soon as they 
become aware of an unlawful occurrence or else lose their rem-
edy for failing to file in a timely fashion. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Aronsen decision is definitive in two areas of ADEA 
procedure. As intractable as the statute itself may seem, Aron-
sen correctly reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit interpretation that in 
a deferral state a grievant has 300 days within which to file a 
claim with the Secretary of Labor. The opinion also announced a 
fair and flexible method for triggering the time limitation, based 
on the factual situation of each occurrence. As perplexing as as-
serting one's right under ADEA may be, Aronsen does clarify 
the initial steps of the procedure. 
Susan D. Hainline· 
• Third year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. No IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER VA HOME LOAN GUAR-
ANTEE PROGRAM 
In Rank v. Nimmo,l the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) no im-
plied right of action exists under the Veterans Administration 
(VA) Home Loan Guarantee Program2 against either the VA or 
a private lender for failure to assist a borrower under that pro-
gram to avoid foreclosure; (2) the VA's lender's handbooks or 
circularss or its broad discretion create no duty in the VA to 
take reasonable measures to avoid foreclosure; and, (3) foreclo-
sure by a private lender who had serviced a VA loan does not 
involve federal action sufficient to invoke constitutional due pro-
cess rights. 
Plaintiffs purchased a home in California for $16,950, 
financing the entire price through a VA guaranteed loan. The 
loan was assigned to the Government National Mortgage Associ-
ation with Kissell Company, a private mortgage firm, acting as 
GNMA's agent for payment collection and servicing in the event 
of foreclosure. Plaintiffs experienced difficulty meeting their 
loan obligations, eventually ceasing their loan payments alto-
gether. The V A informed plaintiffs that it could do nothing to 
prevent a potential foreclosure. Kissell foreclosed on the mort-
gage, and pursuant to the guarantee arrangement, it was con-
veyed to the V A:' 
The court held that "neither the statutory language nor the 
history of the V A Act itself provides any indication of legislative 
intent ... to create" a private remedy against the VA or a pri-
vate lender for failure to help a veteran borrower avoid foreclo-
sure.1I Instead, the court noted, the program was designed to in-
1. 677 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were Nor-
ris, J. and Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en 
bane, May 6, 1982), cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 210 (1982). 
2. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1827 (1976 & Supp. v 1981). 
3. See VA LENDER'S HANDBOOK, VA PAMPHLET No. 26-7 (Revised) which begins: 
"[The Handbook is) designed to guide lenders in the processing of applications for loans 
. . . and in the treatment of defaults and claims arising through loans made. Nothing 
contained here shall be construed to modify or otherwise alter any provisions of the 
[Code of Federal Regulations relating to VA loans)." 677 F.2d at 694. See also VA CIRCU-
LAR 26-75-8 (Jan. 1974) and VA MANUAL M26-3, CHANGE 46,2.35. 
4. 677 F.2d at 695-96. 
5. The same conclusion was reached in Simpson v. Cleland, 640 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 
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duce private lenders to extend home loans to veterans. The 
program therefore "relies on financial incentives to accomplish a 
welfare objective and does not purport to confer enforceable fed-
eral rights directly on the veteran-borrower."6 
In addition, the court noted the availability of apparently 
adequate remedies under the V A Act7 as well as the availability 
of state law remedies to protect mortgagors from improper mort-
gagee practices. Regarding the latter point, the court speculated 
as to the likelihood that Congress intended to establish a "fed-
eral common law of mortgages" to assist or displace the parallel 
laws of the states.6 
As to whether the VA Act imposed a particular duty upon 
the VA to undertake supplemental servicing of its guaranteed 
loans and whether the V A's refusal to take an assignment of 
plaintiffs' loan was a judicially reviewable abllse of discretion, 
the court noted first that the V A Act itself imposes no duty 
upon the VA to service VA loans.9 Therefore, any duty must 
flow from the VA Lender's Handbook and circulars. The latter 
publications would only be granted the force of law if they were 
first considered legislative in nature and not mere statements of 
administrative policy or practice.1o 
1981). 
6. 677 F.2d at 697. 
7. The court referred to 38 U.S.C. §§ 1804(d) and 1816(a) (1976). Section 1804(d) 
authorizes the V A to deny participation in the loan guarantee program to private lenders 
who fail to provide adequate servicing of V A guaranteed loans. Section 1816(a) allows 
the V A to refund the unpaid balance of the loan obligation to the lender and receive an 
assignment of the loan and its security from the lender. 677 F.2d at 697 n.9. As the 
dissent noted, neither "remedy" appears to give borrowers any rights against either the 
VA or the private lender. [d. at 704 n.5. 
8. 677 F.2d at 697. Since Rank only concerned the indirect or guaranteed VA loan 
program, the question remains whether a private right of action may still lie against the 
VA under the direct loan program, 38 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). 
9. 677 F.2d at 699 n.12. 
10. The court cited the two-part test of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301 
(1979), as controlling. Under Brown the VA publications would be given the force of law 
if they (1) announce substantive rules, rather than recite general statements of adminis-
trative policy, and (2) conform to certain procedural requirements. 677 F.2d at 698. 
Courts have consistently held that no duty arises under administrative handbooks 
which essentially are interpreted as general statements of agency policy and procedure. 
See, e.g., Chasse v. Chasen, 595 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1979) (Custom Service Circular created 
no private right of action); First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States, 599 
F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980) (FDIC manual creates no duty 
on part of FDIC to inform bank of incorrect use of bank funds by bank president); 
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The court found that neither publication prescribed sub-
stantive "'legislative-type' rules enforceable . . . against the 
VA."l1 Rather, since some publications were issued merely in re-
sponse to the economic recession of 1974-75, and none were pub-
lished in the Federal Register nor available for public scrutiny, 
no intent to grant them legal force and effect was apparent. To 
do so, the court indicated, would hamper the communication 
within the agency that the circulars provided. Ii 
Addressing the issue of whether the V A abused its discre-
tion in not taking an assignment of plaintiff's loan, the court 
held that the VA statute leaves no doubt that the VA is granted 
the "widest possible discretion" to opt for assignment/refunding, 
depending on numerous factors such as VA budget and person-
nel, risk of loss to the VA, the adequacy of prior loan servicing 
and the circumstances of the default.18 The court concluded that 
the statute was narrowly drafted, specifically granting the V A 
the option to take or refuse an assignment and left no room for 
judicial review of its decision. a 
The court also found the VA was not required to exercise 
the assignment/refunding option according to the language of 
the statute. Even though this issue was judicially reviewable as 
compared to the issue regarding abuse of discretion in failing to 
opt for assignment/refund, the court nevertheless found no con-
gressional intent requiring the V A to exercise the option. III 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that no violation of due pro-
cess occurred because there was an insufficient nexus between 
the VA and the private lender, since the private lender's action 
in foreclosing could not be attributed to the federal 
Brown v. Lynn, 392 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (HUD handbook directing private lend-
ers servicing HUD-insured mortgages to forebear from foreclosure in face of alternatives 
was intended as policy guideline and without legal force or effect). 
11. 677 F.2d at 698. 
12. [d. 
13. [d. at 700. 
14. The decision would be reviewable by showing the V A's improper consideration 
of factors or consideration of factors outside those described by the court. 677 F.2d at 
700. 
15. The court stated the VA was free to exercise the option fully or not at all, re-
serving the option for the "exceptional or unusual case." While not elaborating, the court 
was apparently further underlining its view that the entire matter was not appropriate 
for judicial review. 677 F.2d at 700. 
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government. 16 
Judge Reinhardt dissented from that part of the court's 
opinion concerning the VA's discretion under the VA Act. He 
argued that the V A's failure to take any action regarding plain-
tiffs' loan constituted an illegal failure to exercise its discretion 
thereby requiring the VA to consider opting for assignment/ 
refund. 
The dissent argued that the majority had ignored the sum 
total of congressional intent behind the VA statutes, adopting a 
"newly discovered principle of administrative law" allowing the 
VA to ignore a statute's operating standards and policy.17 He· 
contended that in light of the objectives and techniques set out 
in the laws to accomplish them-to provide incentives for lend-
ing to veteran borrowers and for reasonable forbearance from 
and insurance in the event of foreclosure-it was unlikely that 
Congress had intended such techniques not be considered or 
used.18 The dissent argued that Congress merely intended to 
leave practical decisions to the discretion of the VA, not to allow 
it to completely disregard the mandates inherent in the statutes. 
The dissent also criticized the majority's lack of consistency. 
While agreeing with the court's general view that decisions of 
the agency are not judicially reviewable, the dissent found it in-
consistent and erroneous that the court had later sanctioned the 
VA's failure to make any decision as to plaintiffs' loan. Further, 
the majority's recitation of the "remedies" already available 
under section 1816(a) unpersuasively supported a holding that 
veterans have no private right of action. The section 1816(a) 
remedies, the dissent implied, have nothing to do with whether a 
private remedy also inures to the benefit of veterans. IS 
16. [d. at 701-02. Ct. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 
(1974). 
17. 677 F.2d at 703. 
18. In partial support of this contention, Judge Reinhardt summarized the condi-
tions of notice to the V A as demonstrative of Congress' intent to compel the VA and 
private lenders to carry out the legislative intent. 677 F.2d at 704 n.5. 
19. 677 F.2d at 705. 
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B. No PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 503 OF THE 
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 
In Fisher u. City of Tucson,20 the Ninth Circuit found that 
there was no implied provision for private enforcement of the 
anti-discriminatory policy in contracting situations under sec-
tion 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. U In so finding, the 
court applied the four factors, set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Cort u. Ash, n relevant to determine whether a private right of 
action may be implied to enforce the provisions of a statute 
which does not expressly provide a right of action.23 
The court found that section 503 creates a federal right on 
behalf of a protected class-that of handicapped individuals.24 
20. 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Farris, 
J. and Fletcher, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 178 (1982). 
21. Section 503 provides that: "Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any 
Federal department or agency ... shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing 
persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall 
take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped in-
dividuals." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976). 
Section 793(b) provides: 
If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has 
failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of his contract 
with the United States, relating to employment of handi-
capped individuals, such individual may file a complaint with 
the Department of Labor. The Department shall promptly in-
vestigate such complaint and shall take such action thereon as 
the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms 
of such contract and the laws and regulations applicable 
thereto. 
22. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
23. The factors are: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial bene-
fit the statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a 
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any in-
dication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to cre-
ate such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply 
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of 
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basi-
cally the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropri-
ate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. 
[d. at 78-79 (citations omitted). 
24. 663 F.2d at 863-64. This finding was contrary to that of Rogers v. Frito-Lay, 
Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980), where the Fifth 
Circuit also concluded that section 503 does not create a private right of action. Other 
circuits have considered the question presented in Fisher, and have found that no pri-
vate right of action exists. See Davis v. United Airlines, 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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However, examining the legislative intent, the court concluded 
that the federal right did not provide such individuals with a 
private right of action. This conclusion turned upon several ob-
servations. First, the affirmative action requirement reflects con-
gressional concern for the class, rather than the individual.211 
Second, the court was aware of no situation in which Congress 
had expressly granted a private right of action to enforce affirm-
ative action law.2s Third, Congress did not make discrimination 
against handicapped persons unlawful in section 503. Rather, it 
"mandated that contractors discriminate in favor of handi-
capped individuals by implementing affirmative action pro-
grams."27 Finally, where a handicapped person has been discrim-
inated against, that individual may file a complaint with the 
Department of Labor.lIB 
With regard to the underlying purpose of the legislative 
scheme, the panel noted that "the provision of an express ad-
ministrative remedy . . . created at least some basis to conclude 
that a private right of action would be inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the legislative scheme. "29 Considering the presence of 
the administrative enforcement mechanism and section 503's in-
struction that contractors undertake affirmative action to em-
ploy handicapped persons, the court concluded that Congress in-
tended that the Department of Labor supervise affirmative 
action programs.80 Under these circumstances, the court chose 
not to imply what Congress failed to expressly provide.81 
Judge Fletcher concurred with the majority's finding that 
section 503 creates no private right of action. However, she fur-
ther found that Congress did intend to create a private right of 
action to enforce section 503. In 1978, the Rehabilitation Act 
was amended to allow a private party to recover attorney's fees 
25. 663 F.2d at 864·65. The court also found that section 503 does not, on its face, 
prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons. [d. at 864. See text of statute at 
note 21, supra. Therefore, section 503 is distinguishable from section 504 of the Act 
which provides a private right of action for handicapped individuals discriminated 
against in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. [d. at 864. 
26. 663 F.2d at 865. 
27. [d. at 864 (emphasis in original). 
28. [d. at 865. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976), quoted at note 21, supra. 
29. 663 F.2d at 866, quoting Rogers, supra note 24, at 1084. 
30. 663 F.2d at 866·67. 
31. [d. at 867. 
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as part of costs incurred in enforcing any provision of the Act.32 
The dissent found that this amendment indicated that Congress 
assumed a private right of action under the Act already ex-
isted.33 Further, the 1978 amendment committee and the 1973 
committee responsible for enacting section 503 were composed 
of many of the same members of Congress, several of whom 
stated that they intended to create a private right of action.34 
The dissent also found the underlying purpose of the legis-
lative scheme to be consistent with allowing a private right of 
action. The dissent disagreed with the majority's position that 
since a remedy exists with the Department of Labor, a private 
action under section 503 is foreclosed. The dissent observed that 
dual enforcement schemes are commonplace.311 Further, the De-
partment of Labor, the agency charged with enforcement, sup-
ports the private right of action as a complement to the adminis-
trative mechanism.38 Finally, section 503 is analogous to Title 
IX as both have similar objectives-to confer benefits on a spe-
cific class of persons. Since the Supreme Court found an implied 
right of action consistent with .the Title IX enforcement 
scheme,37 the same result should be reached with respect to sec-
tion 503.38 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 749a(b) (Supp. II 1978). 
33. 663 F.2d at .868. The majority agreed that the addition of the attorney's fees 
provision created an inference that Congress assumed a private right had been created in 
1973. However, the majority found that because there was no indication that Congress 
intended "to launch into a new area by providing a private right of action to enforce an 
affirmative action law" and no "indication of how such a right would be enforced," Con-
gress did not intend to create a private right of action when it enacted section 503. [d. at 
866. 
34. [d. at 869. 
35. [d. at 870. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976) (Title VI) and 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) 
(Title IX). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) (Title VII) (allowing private right of 
action after exhausting administrative remedies); Allen v. State Board of Education, 393 
U.S. 544 (1969) (finding private right of action under Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
U.S.C. § 1973 (1976), despite provisions for enforcement by the Attorney General). 
36. 663 F.2d at 870. 
37. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979). 
38. 663 F.2d at 870-71. 
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